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PRESERVING RIGHTS OR PERPETUATING CHAOS: AN 
ANALYSIS OF OHIO’S PRIVATE CHALLENGERS OF 
VOTERS ACT AND THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN 
SUMMIT COUNTY DEMOCRATIC CENTRAL AND 
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE V. BLACKWELL 
By Dale Smith*
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With the seventh highest population among the fifty states, Ohio 
plays a critical role in presidential elections.1  In fact, no Republican 
presidential candidate has ever made it to the White House without 
winning Ohio.2  Furthermore, only two Democrats since 1900 have won 
a presidential election without taking the Buckeye State.3  Political 
experts believe Ohio is a microcosm of the country because issues of 
great importance to Ohioans typically reflect those important to the rest 
of the country.  Additionally, Ohio cannot be classified as either urban 
or rural.  Ohio has twenty-seven counties with populations over 100,000, 
yet nearly two million of its residents are involved in the agricultural 
industry.4  Like many other states, the recent economic recession has 
significantly impacted Ohio through job losses in the manufacturing 
sector. 
In the months preceding the 2004 election, both President George W. 
Bush and Senator John Kerry recognized the weight Ohio would carry in 
the presidential race.  By the end of July, President Bush had already 
visited six times and sent more than 50,000 volunteers to Ohio.5  Four of 
the top five media markets targeted by the presidential campaigns were 
 * Associate Member, 2005–2006 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. See U.S. Census Bureau home page, http://www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NST-
EST2004-01.xls (last visited Sep. 20, 2005).  Ohio’s Resident population as of July 1, 2004, was 
11,459,011.  Id.  The presidential candidate that wins the popular vote in Ohio receives twenty electoral 
votes.  See Federal Election Commission home page, http://www.fec.gov/pages/elecvote.htm (last 
visited Sep. 20, 2005). 
 2. James Taranto, With Trends Like These . . . , WALL ST. J., July 27, 2004, at A16. 
 3. Case Western Reserve University, All Eyes on Ohio: Experts from Case Explain Why 
Winning the Buckeye State is Essential for the 2004 Presidential Candidates (Aug. 3, 2004), 
http://www.case.edu/news/2004/8-04/why_ohio.htm (“Since first casting a ballot for President in 1804, 
Ohioans have voted with the winning candidate 82% of the time.”). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
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cities in Ohio and more political advertisements were purchased in Ohio 
than any other state except Florida.6  Given the national recognition of 
Ohio as a bellwether state and the result of Florida’s popular vote in the 
2000 election, where President Bush defeated Al Gore by a mere 537 
votes,7 each political party acknowledged the importance of registering 
new voters who would support its candidate.  Additionally, both parties 
understood the significance of preventing ineligible voters from casting 
their votes for the other party. 
The importance of these issues in the 2004 presidential election was 
prevalent throughout Ohio, particularly in the Cincinnati area.  Between 
January 2004 and the November election, approximately 84,000 new 
voters were registered in Hamilton County alone.8  Leaders from the 
Republican Party recognized that a majority of new voters would be 
supporting John Kerry, and in the weeks preceding the election, they 
compiled a list of 35,000 registered Democrats suspected to be ineligible 
to vote.9  Under Ohio law, political parties are permitted to designate 
challengers at each precinct to challenge voters’ eligibility.10
On October 20, 2004, Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell issued a 
memorandum to all county boards of elections containing guidelines for 
implementing Ohio’s voter challenger law.11  Blackwell issued the 
memorandum because the statute does not specify the procedures and 
limitations for challenging voters.12  The memo instructed that 
challengers could challenge voters only for good cause, and if a 
challenger unnecessarily delayed the voting process or intimidated 
voters, the presiding judge of the precinct was to take immediate 
action.13  The memo also instructed that once a voter was challenged, 
the presiding judge was to administer form 10-U,14 which requires the 
voter to swear under oath that he or she will truthfully answer the 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Lance deHaven-Smith, Clearing Up the Election That Won’t Die, TALLAHASSEE 
DEMOCRAT, Sep. 2, 2002. 
 8. Spencer v. Blackwell, 347 F. Supp. 2d 528, 535 (S.D. Ohio 2004). 
 9. Jordan Green, Cincinnati Takes on Jim Crow-Era Voter Challenger Law, S. EXPOSURE, Nov. 
9, 2004, available at http://www.southernstudies.org/reports/OhioProvisionals.pdf (last visited Sep. 20, 
2005).  This list was compiled by mailing cards to newly registered voters and marking the pieces of 
mail returned because the address was wrong.  Id. 
 10. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.21 (West 2005).  This statute will be discussed in further 
detail in Part II. 
 11. See Spencer, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 531.  This law is codified as section 3505.20 of the Ohio 
Revised Code.  This statute will be discussed in Part II. 
 12.  See Spencer, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 531. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Form 10-U is an affidavit the challenged voter is required to sign to maintain his or her 
eligibility. 
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questions regarding his or her eligibility to vote and then sign an 
affidavit under penalty of a fifth-degree felony for election 
falsification.15
Two days after Blackwell issued the memorandum, the Hamilton 
County Republican Party filed for hundreds of challengers to be 
physically present in the polling places in order to challenge the 
eligibility of voters.16  In previous elections, precinct executives that 
served as challengers for political parties in Hamilton County had not 
actually come to polling places or participated in eligibility challenges.17  
Furthermore, the Republican Party filed for 251 challengers in addition 
to the precinct executive challengers.18  Tim Burke, chairman of the 
Hamilton County Board of Elections, testified that two-thirds of the 
additional Republican challengers filed to be present at predominantly 
African-American precincts.19
In response to the Republican Party’s plan to send hundreds of 
challengers to predominantly African-American precincts, a lawsuit was 
filed on October 27, 2004, against Blackwell, the Hamilton County 
Board of Elections, and the chair and individual members of that 
board.20  The plaintiffs in this case were Marian and Donald Spencer, a 
couple residing in a predominantly African-American neighborhood in 
Cincinnati.21  The Spencers sought to enjoin the defendants from 
allowing any challengers other than election judges and other electors 
into the polling places on Election Day, alleging that the defendants had 
“combined to implement a voter challenge system at the polls on 
Election Day that discriminates against African-American voters.”22  
Around the time the Spencers filed in the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of Ohio, the Summit County Democratic Central and 
Executive Committee initiated a similar suit in the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of Ohio.23  This suit alleged that enforcement 
 15.  Spencer, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 531. 
 16. Id. at 530. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id.  Hamilton County estimated that 629 Republican challengers would be present at polling 
places on Election Day.  Id. at 530 n.3. 
 19. Id.  Evidence shown at the district court hearing for Spencer showed that only fourteen 
percent of new voters in majority white polling places would face a Republican party challenger, while 
ninety-seven percent of new voters in predominantly African-American voting locations would see a 
challenger.  Id. 
 20. See id. at 529. 
 21. Id.  Marian Spencer estimated that one hundred percent of the voters in her precinct (ward 
13, precinct H) were African-American.  Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. Blackwell (Summit County II), 
388 F.3d 547, 549 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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of the voter challenger law deprived Ohio citizens of their constitutional 
rights to due process and equal protection.24
On October 29, the Secretary of State issued a statement 
recommending the removal of challengers from polling places to 
Attorney General Jim Petro.25  While Blackwell did not address the 
constitutionality of the voter challenger statute, he believed “a full airing 
of the issues [could not] be completed prior to Tuesday’s election.”26  
Despite this recommendation, Petro refused to exclude challengers from 
polling places on Election Day.27  He based his decision on his duty as 
attorney general to defend Ohio’s laws, and he stated that Ohio citizens 
would have the right to challenge voters at polling places until the law 
was declared unconstitutional.28
On October 31, the Northern District of Ohio court granted a motion 
for a temporary restraining order, stipulating that “persons appointed as 
challengers may not be present at the polling place for the sole purpose 
of challenging the qualifications of other voters” on Election Day.29  
The next day, the Southern District of Ohio court granted a similar 
motion in Spencer v. Blackwell.30  The motions granted in each case 
were immediately appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit consolidated the appeals.  Around midnight on 
November 2, Election Day, the Sixth Circuit overturned both decisions, 
allowing challengers to be present at polling places.31
This Comment advocates for a new standard in Ohio regarding the 
right of appointed parties and private individuals to challenge the 
eligibility of voters at polling places.  Based on the United States 
Constitution, federal statutes, and prior case law, the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision was incorrect.  The Ohio regulations are not narrowly tailored 
to protect the compelling interest of protecting voters from intimidation 
at the polls.  Part II of this Comment presents the federal and state law 
surrounding the issue.  Part III analyzes the opinions from the two 
federal district court cases and the Sixth Circuit case that was decided 
the morning of the November election.  Part IV examines statutes from 
other states that regulate voter challenges at polling places.  This Part 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Spencer, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 532. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. Blackwell (Summit County I), No. 
5:04CV2165, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22539, at *27. 
 30. Spencer, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 538. 
 31. See Green, supra note 9. 
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also explains why the Ohio statute conflicts with federal law and is 
unconstitutional and why the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Summit County 
Democratic and Central Committee v. Blackwell was erroneous.  Part V 
discusses the impact the Sixth Circuit’s opinion had on the November 
election and recommends changes the Ohio legislature should make to 
comply with federal law. 
II.  ELECTION LAW 
In order to analyze the validity of the Ohio challenger statutes and the 
Sixth Circuit’s opinion, an understanding of the existing legislation and 
case law governing the matter is necessary.  This Part examines 
constitutional amendments, federal statutes, federal case law, and the 
relevant Ohio statutes to provide a framework for analysis. 
A.  U.S. Constitutional Amendments 
The Fifteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects 
the right to vote and prevents infringement of that right by the States on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.32  Section two 
of the Amendment gives Congress the power to enforce this right 
through appropriate legislation.33  The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
States from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.34
B.  Federal Statutory Law 
Pursuant to section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution, Congress enacted the Help America Vote Act of 2002 
(HAVA).35  This act was passed in response to the problems that 
occurred in the 2000 presidential election.36  This Comment is 
particularly concerned with section 15482 of HAVA, which addresses 
 32. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 33. Id. § 2. 
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 35. See Help America Vote Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545 (2004). 
 36. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section home page, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/hava/hava.html (last visited Sep. 20, 2005).  The legislative aims of 
HAVA are: “(1) creating a new federal agency to serve as a clearinghouse for election administration 
information; (2) providing funds to states to improve election administration and replace outdated voting 
systems; and (3) creating minimum standards for states to follow in several key areas of election 
administration.”  Id. 
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provisional voting and voting information requirements.37  According to 
this section, if an individual claims to be a registered voter and eligible 
to vote in an election for federal office in the jurisdiction where he 
desires to vote, but his name does not appear on the list of eligible 
voters, he must be permitted to cast a provisional ballot.38  The presiding 
election official at that polling place must notify the individual of this 
right, and the individual must execute a written affirmation declaring his 
eligibility.39  This section of HAVA also requires the election official to 
promptly verify provisional ballots and provide information to the 
individual filing the ballot that enables the voter to find out whether or 
not his vote was counted and, if it was not counted, the reason behind 
this decision.40
C.  Federal Case Law 
In addition to the federal statutory law on point, a great deal of 
precedent has been handed down from the United States Supreme Court 
governing the disenfranchisement of voters and the abridgement of 
fundamental rights in general.  The ratification of the Fifteenth 
Amendment in 1870 prohibited the states from disenfranchising 
individuals on the basis of race.41  In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court 
held that “[a] citizen’s right to vote free of arbitrary impairment by state 
action has been judicially recognized as a right secured by the 
Constitution . . .”42  In Yick Wo v. Hopkins the Court referred to “the 
political franchise of voting” as a “fundamental political right, because it 
is preservative of all rights.”43  The Supreme Court has also declared: 
The right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic 
society.  Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and 
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, 
any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully 
and meticulously scrutinized.44
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 15482. 
 38. 42 U.S.C. § 15482(a). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 42. 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962).  In Baker, a group of Tennessee citizens challenged a state statute 
that allegedly appointed state representatives without reference to any logical formula.  The Court 
reversed the lower court’s dismissal, holding that the complaint’s allegations of a denial of equal 
protection presented a justiciable constitutional cause of action upon which plaintiffs were entitled to a 
trial and a decision.  Id. 
 43. 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). 
 44. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964).  In this case the plaintiffs alleged that, 
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The Court in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections held that 
where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal 
Protection Clause, classifications that might invade or restrain them 
must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined.45  The Court also 
held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
restrains the states from enacting voter qualifications that invidiously 
discriminate.46
Recent Supreme Court decisions have also reinforced the fundamental 
nature of the right to vote.  In Burson v. Freeman, the Court held that 
allowing vote solicitation near the polls would cause voter 
intimidation.47  The Supreme Court has also recognized that, “as a 
practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if 
they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than 
chaos, is to accompany the democratic process.”48  In Bush v. Gore, the 
Court stated that the individual citizen has no federal constitutional right 
to vote for electors of the president, but once a state legislature vests the 
right to vote for the president in its people, that right is fundamental.49  
The Court further held that, having once granted the right to vote on 
equal terms, the state may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, 
value one person’s vote over that of another.50  The opinion declared 
that equal protection of the law applies to the manner in which a law is 
exercised.51  The Court also stated that, where state officials confer 
authority on local election officials, the state may have a greater burden 
despite uneven population growth from 1900 to 1960, the failure of the Alabama legislature to 
reapportion itself denied them equal suffrage in free and equal elections and the equal protection of the 
law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 541. 
 45. 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).  In Harper, residents of Virginia filed an action against the voting 
officials, seeking a declaration that a poll tax was unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.  Id. 
 46. Id. at 666. 
 47. 504 U.S. 191, 206 (1992).  Here the Court held that, because activity, even in a public forum, 
may interfere with other important activities for which the property is used, the government may 
regulate the time, place, and manner of the expressive activity, so long as such restrictions are content 
neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open ample 
alternatives for communication.  Id. at 197. 
 48. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997) (quoting Storer v. 
Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).  In this case, the Court also held that if an election regulation 
imposes a severe burden, the regulation must be narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.  Id. 
 49. 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000).  Bush v. Gore examined whether the recount procedures adopted by 
the lower court were consistent with its obligation to avoid arbitrary and disparate treatment of the 
members of its electorate. In a per curiam opinion, the Court concluded that the lower court’s decision 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the lower court failed to 
identify and require standards for accepting or rejecting contested ballots.  Id. 
 50. Id. at 104–05. 
 51. Id. at 104. 
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to ensure the equal application of its laws to voters.52  This case suggests 
that deprivations of voters’ rights because of administrative 
malfeasance, disregard of the rules, or failure to apply the rules equally 
to all voters is against the law.53
The Supreme Court set forth a test for district courts to use when 
deciding constitutional challenges to specific provisions of a state’s 
election law in Anderson v. Celebrezze.54  A district court must first 
consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights 
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff 
seeks to vindicate.55  It must then identify and evaluate the precise 
interests put forward by the state as justification for the burden imposed 
by its law.56  The court must not only determine the strength of the 
state’s interest, but also the extent to which those interests make it 
necessary to burden the voters’ rights.57  After balancing all of these 
factors, a court must then determine whether the challenged provision is 
constitutional.58
D. Ohio Law 
Based on the text of HAVA, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution, and the Supreme Court 
decisions that interpret those amendments, any state attempting to 
challenge the eligibility of its voters must be precise in both statutory 
language and application.  This section examines the language of the 
Ohio statutes applicable to determine whether they comply with federal 
guidelines. 
Section 3505.20 of the Ohio Revised Code (Voter Challenger Statute) 
declares that any person attempting to vote at a polling place may have 
his or her eligibility challenged by any challenger, any elector then 
lawfully in the polling place, or any judge or clerk of elections.59  If a 
voter is challenged, the presiding judge administers an oath to the voter, 
 52. Id. at 109. 
 53. See Barry H. Weinberg & Lyn Utrecht, Problems in America’s Polling Places: How Can 
They Be Stopped, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 401, 434–35 (2002). 
 54. 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).  In this case, an independent candidate in the presidential election 
challenged an Ohio statute the preventing independent candidates from declaring their eligibility after a 
certain date.  The Court set forth the standard for determining the constitutionality of statutes regulating 
the election process.  Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.20 (West 2005). 
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and the election judges then ask that individual a series of questions 
depending on the basis for the challenge.60  The statute further requires 
that the presiding judge shall put forth such other questions to the 
challenged party as necessary to test that potential voter’s 
qualifications.61  If the person challenged refuses to answer any 
question, is unable to answer a question, or refuses to sign his or her 
name, or if for any other reason a majority of the judges believes the 
person is not entitled to vote, the judges shall refuse the person a 
ballot.62
Section 3505.21 of the Ohio Revised Code (Appointment of 
Challengers Statute) governs the appointment of challengers at polling 
places.63  This statute allows any political party supporting candidates to 
be voted upon at that election and any group of five or more candidates 
to appoint challengers at polling places.64  This section requires political 
parties appointing challengers to notify the board of elections of the 
names and addresses of its appointees and the polling places at which 
they shall serve not less than eleven days before the election.65  The 
statute requires individuals appointed as challengers to take an oath that 
they will not cause undue delay and will not disclose how any elector 
has voted in that election.66
Section 3505.22 of the Ohio Revised Code (Impersonating Voter 
Statute) bestows upon any precinct officer, challenger, or other elector 
the ability to question the right to vote of another individual if the 
questioning party believes that individual is impersonating an elector.67  
If, in the opinion of a majority of the precinct officers, the signature is 
not that of the person who signed such name in the registration forms, 
then such person may be refused a ballot.68  The individual who is 
 60. Spencer v. Blackwell, 347 F. Supp. 2d 528, 530 (S.D. Ohio 2004).  Section 3505.20 of the 
Ohio Revised Code instructs that a person may be challenged on the grounds that (1) he or she is not a 
citizen, (2) he or she has not resided in Ohio for thirty days immediately preceding the election, (3) he or 
she is not a resident of the county or precinct where he or she has arrived to vote, or (4) he or she is not 
of legal voting age. 
 61. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.20. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. § 3505.21. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.  The oath is as follows: “You do solemnly swear that you will faithfully and impartially 
discharge the duties as an official challenger and witness, assigned by law; that you will not cause any 
delay to persons offering to vote, further than is necessary to procure satisfactory information of their 
qualification as electors; and that you will not disclose or communicate to any person how any elector 
has voted at such election.”  Id. 
 67. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.22. 
 68. Id. 
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refused a ballot may appeal that decision immediately to the board of 
elections.69
III.  SPENCER AND SUMMIT COUNTY 
This Part analyzes the opinions of the two district court cases ordering 
preliminary injunctions to prevent challengers from being present at 
polling places.  It then examines the Sixth Circuit ruling handed down 
the morning of Election Day that reversed the district courts’ decisions 
and allowed for implementation of the Voter Challenger Statute. 
A.  District Court Holdings 
Judge Susan J. Dlott of the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of Ohio based her decision in Spencer on an analysis of the four 
factors considered in determining the appropriateness of a preliminary 
injunction.70  When examining the likelihood of success on the merits, 
the court acknowledged that the polling places faced an extraordinary 
and potentially disastrous risk of intimidation and delay based on the 
number of newly registered voters and the presence of inexperienced 
challengers.71  The court determined that this delay and intimidation 
could severely burden the right to vote, and that prevention of 
intimidation was a compelling state interest.72  It then considered 
whether the regulation imposed by the Voter Challenger Statute was 
narrowly tailored to serve this purpose.73  The court concluded that the 
challengers at polling places had the same purpose as the election 
judges, and because election judges are knowledgeable and experienced 
in identifying potentially ineligible voters, a law allowing the disruption 
of the system by individuals with no experience in the process is not 
narrowly tailored. 
The court discussed the additional factors considered when deciding a 
motion for a preliminary injunction.  However, it primarily based its 
decision on the plaintiffs’ showing of substantial likelihood of success 
 69. Id. 
 70. Spencer v. Blackwell, 347 F. Supp. 2d 528, 533 (S.D. Ohio 2004).  Pursuant to Leary v. 
Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000), the court considers the following factors: “(1) whether 
the movant has a ‘strong’ likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would otherwise 
suffer irreparable injury; (3) whether issuance of a preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm 
to others; and (4) whether the public would be served by issuance of a preliminary injunction.” 
 71. Spencer, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 535. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 536–37. 
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on the merits on the ground that allowing challengers at polling places is 
unconstitutional.74
Judge John R. Adams of the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio advanced similar justifications when deciding the 
Summit County case.  However, the Northern District opinion contained 
an in-depth analysis to determine whether the standing requirement was 
met.75  The court decided that, because individual voters were named as 
plaintiffs, and because voters faced an imminent and particularized risk 
of the deprivation of their constitutionally protected equal protection and 
due process rights, the plaintiffs had the requisite standing to pursue the 
claim.76
When analyzing the factors for a preliminary injunction, the court 
recognized that preventing election fraud is a compelling state interest, 
but it determined that the Voter Challenger Statute was not narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest.77  The court reasoned that because election 
judges already have the power to challenge potential voters and because 
Ohio has a process for handling voter challenges prior to Election Day,78 
no additional challengers were necessary at polling places.79
The court went on to recognize that voters have a fundamental right to 
participate in elections, but that no fundamental right to challenge other 
voters exists.80  It held that if challengers were permitted at polling 
places significant harm was substantially likely to occur not only to 
voters, but also to the voting process as a whole.81  The court speculated 
that random challenges without cause by one political party could result 
in retaliatory challenges by the other party, giving rise to chaos and a 
level of voter frustration that would turn qualified electors away from 
the polls.82
B.  Sixth Circuit Holding 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit consolidated the 
appeals for the two district court cases and issued one ruling regarding 
 74. Id. at 537. 
 75. Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. Blackwell (Summit County I), No. 
5:04CV2165, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22539, at **10–15 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2004). 
 76. Id. at *15. 
 77. Id. at **20–21. 
 78. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.19 (West 2005). 
 79. Summit County I, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22539, at *21. 
 80. Id. at *22. 
 81. Id. at *24. 
 82. Id. at *25. 
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the motion for an emergency stay of the district court orders.83  A three-
judge panel consisting of Judges John Rogers, James Ryan, and R. Guy 
Cole, Jr. heard the appeal.84  In a 2-1 decision, the panel stayed the two 
district court orders.85  The panel issued three separate opinions.86  This 
section examines each opinion. 
When addressing the standing requirement, Judge Rogers determined 
that there was a nonspeculative possibility that voters would face delay 
and inconvenience when voting.87  Based on this possibility, he held that 
the plaintiffs had met the standing requirement.88  However, when 
examining the merits of the claim, Judge Rogers concluded that the 
possibility of longer lines and confusion at polling places did not amount 
to the severe burden upon the right to vote that required the statute to be 
declared unconstitutional.89  This opinion also held that the policy 
considerations in favor of allowing registered voters to vote freely did 
not outweigh either the state’s right to prevent ineligible voters from 
casting ballots or the public interest in the smooth and effective 
administration of voting laws.90  Based on these considerations, he 
granted the motion to stay the district court orders.91
The concurring opinion of Judge Ryan reasoned that the motion 
should be stayed because the plaintiffs did not show that they had met 
the standing requirement.92  This opinion stated that the Voter 
Challenger Statute had been on the books in Ohio for decades, and the 
problems of voter intimidation, chaos, confusion, and inordinate delay 
had never occurred in previous elections.93
In his dissent Judge R. Guy Cole, Jr. reasoned that because the State 
has other measures in place to prevent voter fraud at the polls balancing 
the competing interests in a vacuum was improper.94  This opinion also 
recognized the plans of Republican challengers to target precincts with 
predominantly African-American voters without any legal restrictions 
 83. See Summit County Democratic Cent. and Executive Comm. v. Blackwell (Summit County 
II), 388 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 84. See Edward B. Foley, Sixth Circuit Opinions in Polling Place Challenges Cases: A 
Preliminary Analysis (Nov. 2, 2004), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/analysis/041102a.html. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Summit County II, 388 F.3d at 550. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 551. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. (Ryan, J., concurring). 
 93. Id. at 552. 
 94. Id. (Cole, J., dissenting). 
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and maintained that the court should have erred on the side of protecting 
those exercising the right to vote.95
Judge Cole referred to the evidence cited by the district courts 
supporting the conclusion that permitting voter challenges could lead to 
suppression, intimidation, and chaos at polls.96  He then illustrated his 
concern with the following hypothetical situation.  Hundreds of 
Republican lawyers arrive at polling places to challenge voters followed 
by hundreds of Democratic lawyers to challenge those challenges, a 
situation he described as a “recipe for confusion and chaos.”97  Judge 
Cole also argued, “voter intimidation is likely [here] because the 
partisan operatives at the polls will be challenging the right to vote itself, 
rather than merely campaigning for a particular candidate or issue.”98  
He concluded by stating that the citizens of Ohio should have the right 
to vote without threat of suppression, intimidation, or chaos created by 
partisan politics.99
IV.  DISCUSSION 
This Part surveys a sample of laws from other states and analyzes the 
procedural safeguards that are in place to ensure that the rights of the 
voter are not infringed upon.  It then examines the inherent conflicts 
between the Voter Challenger Statute in Ohio and federal law discussed 
in Part II.  Finally, this Part discusses the flaws in the reasoning of the 
Sixth Circuit’s ruling and argues that the outcome should have been 
different. 
A.  Statutes from Other Jurisdictions Regulating the Right to Challenge 
Voters 
This section examines statutes from a sample of states and compares 
these statutes to Ohio’s law regarding voter challenges and the right of 
voters to cast provisional ballots.  The section concludes that the Ohio 
statutory provisions do not provide adequate safeguards to prevent 
foreseeable problems from occurring at polling places. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 553.  In Spencer, Judge Dlott of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Ohio heard testimony of challengers displaying an incomplete or confused understanding of the proper 
election procedures, relevant statistics as to the racial population of certain counties that were targeted, 
and the lack of guidelines regarding how to deal with challenges—and found that this was likely to lead 
to voter intimidation.  Id. 
 97. Id. at 554. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 555. 
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Arizona law permits the county chairman of each political party to 
designate a party representative for each polling place to act as a 
challenger.  When the eligibility of a voter is challenged, election 
officials determine whether the challenged party is registered in that 
precinct.100  If it appears that the challenged person is registered, the 
officials will then ask the person to take an oath declaring his eligibility 
to vote and ask the person questions material to the challenge.101  If the 
person challenged refuses to be sworn or affirmed, or refuses to answer 
questions material to the challenge, the person is still entitled to cast a 
provisional ballot.102  The validity of this provisional ballot is 
determined at a later date.103  Unlike Ohio’s statute, Arizona’s law 
allows any voter to fill out a provisional ballot, even if the elector 
refuses to take an oath declaring his eligibility. 
In California, only a member of that precinct’s board of elections may 
challenge a voter.104  California law also requires that voter challenges 
only be made under certain circumstances set forth in the statute.105  In 
addition to the statute regulating voter challenges, California has another 
statute stating, “Any doubt in the interpretation of the law shall be 
resolved in favor of the challenged voter.”106  Unlike the Ohio statute, 
which permits challenges from any eligible voter, California law 
requires that voter challenges come directly from precinct officials.  This 
ensures that the party making the challenge is familiar with the 
guidelines of voter challenges.  The California statute also categorizes 
grounds for challenging a vote, unlike the laws in Ohio and other 
jurisdictions that allow a party to challenge for “good cause,” but 
provide no guidelines.  California also ensures that any ambiguity in the 
enforcement of the law will not act to disenfranchise the voter.  Ohio has 
no such law protecting voters from ambiguous interpretations of the law. 
Georgia law allows any voter to challenge the eligibility of any other 
voter whose name appears on the list of electors.107  However, this law 
 100. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-592 (2001). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. § 16-584. 
 104. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14240 (West 2004). 
 105. See id.  The challenge can only be made if the board member has reason to believe: 
(1) That the voter is not the person whose name appears on the list of voters.  (2) That the 
voter is not a resident of the precinct.  (3) That the voter is not a citizen of the United 
States.  (4) That the voter has voted that day.  (5) That the voter is presently on parole for 
conviction of a felony. 
Id. 
 106. Id. § 14251. 
 107. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-230 (2005). 
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requires that the challenge be made in writing and distinctly specify the 
grounds for the challenge.108  Upon the filing of a challenge, the board 
of registrars meets immediately to determine whether probable cause 
exists to sustain a challenge.109  If the registrars find probable cause, the 
challenged party has a right to answer the challenge at that time, or cast 
an absentee ballot and wait for a hearing to determine the validity of his 
vote.110  At this hearing, the challenging party still has the burden of 
proving that the voter is not eligible.111  Either side can appeal the 
decision made by the registrars at this hearing to the superior court.112  
While Georgia law does not place limitations on the source of the voter 
challenge, it is the only state examined that requires voter challenges be 
reduced to writing.  This helps ensure that challenges will not be made 
arbitrarily because the challenger must also state adequate grounds for 
the challenge.  Unlike Ohio, Georgia law guarantees the challenged 
voter’s right to cast a provisional ballot while the challenge is pending.  
Georgia also offers an appellate process to voters whose right is initially 
denied. 
Illinois law permits election judges, pollwatchers, or any eligible 
voter to challenge the status of any other voter.113  If the challenge is 
sustained by a majority of the election judges, then the voter challenged 
still has the opportunity to cast a provisional ballot, so long as the 
challenged party signs an affidavit affirming his eligibility to vote.114  A 
person casting a provisional ballot may ascertain whether the provisional 
vote was counted and, if not counted, the reason it was not counted.115  
Illinois law gives local election boards the authority to design its own 
provisional voting verification system, but stipulates that the system 
must be in compliance with HAVA.116  The Illinois regulations for voter 
challenges are similar to the laws in Ohio.  However, the Illinois law on 
provisional voting verification systems strictly complies with the 
requirements of HAVA, and therefore does not attempt to supercede 
federal law.  This is an example of the minimum protections a state must 
provide in order to comply with federal law. 
South Carolina law permits voter challenges by watchers, electors, or 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. § 23-2-229. 
 112. Id. 
 113. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18A-5 (West 2004). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
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managers,117  but stipulates the circumstances for which a challenge can 
be made.118  Once a person is challenged, that person must insist they 
are an eligible voter in order to receive a provisional ballot.119  The voter 
then fills out the provisional ballot, and the ballot will be placed in an 
envelope and kept separate from the rest of the ballots.120  If the 
challenger cannot offer adequate evidence that the person is not eligible 
to vote, the provisional ballot is taken out of its envelope and 
commingled with the other ballots.121  South Carolina law complies with 
the HAVA provision entitling any person willing to take an oath 
declaring his eligibility to vote to a provisional ballot.  However, like the 
Ohio and Georgia statutes, the South Carolina regulation places no 
limitation the source of the challenge.  A measure such as this ensures 
that a voter will be allowed to cast a ballot but does not guarantee that 
the voter will be free from undue delay. 
In Texas, only persons admitted to vote and precinct election officials 
are permitted to be within the polling place when the election is being 
conducted.122  Previously, Texas had a statute permitting election 
officials, watchers, or other persons to challenge the eligibility of a 
voter.123  However, this act has since been repealed.124  Every voter is 
required to provide a statement of residence.125  A voter may only be 
challenged if that party refuses to submit a statement of residence or if 
the voter’s name does not appear on a poll list.126  However, any party 
that is not permitted to vote is entitled to cast a provisional ballot if that 
person executes an affidavit stating his eligibility to vote in that 
precinct.127  The Texas statute eliminates the possibility that challenges 
will be arbitrarily applied by requiring every voter to submit a statement 
declaring his residence.  Even if a voter is unable or unwilling to declare 
his residence he will be permitted to cast a provisional ballot, in 
accordance with HAVA. 
 117. See Greene v. S.C. Election Comm’n, 445 S.E.2d 451 (S.C. 1994). 
 118. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-830 (2005).  The vote can be challenged based on the person’s 
right to vote in that precinct, qualifications to vote, or the absence of his or her name on the voter 
registration list and the inability of the election commission to verify that the voter is registered to vote 
in that precinct. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 61.001 (Vernon 2004). 
 123. See id. § 61.010. 
 124. Law of Sep. 1, 1997, Chs. 1078, 1349 (repealed Jan. 1, 2004). 
 125. § 63.0011. 
 126. See id. § 61.001. 
 127. Id. § 61.011. 
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In Virginia, any qualified voter may challenge the vote of any person 
who is listed on the pollbook but is known or suspected not to be a 
qualified voter.128  If the challenged person insists that he or she is a 
qualified voter and the challenge is not withdrawn, one of the election 
officers shall give the voter a form containing a sworn statement for that 
person to sign.129  So long as the challenged person signs the statement, 
he or she will be permitted to vote on the voting system used at that 
precinct.130  The Virginia statute, like the Illinois statute, places no 
limitation on which party may challenge the voter.  However unlike the 
Ohio statute, Virginia and Illinois guarantee that any person who takes 
an oath declaring his eligibility cannot be entirely disenfranchised. 
Examining these various regulations shows that many states value the 
rights of third parties to challenge the eligibility of voters.  However, 
every state examined provides at least one procedural safeguard that 
Ohio does not offer for the protection of its voters.  California and Texas 
require voter challenges to come from qualified election officials.  These 
two states also categorize the grounds for which a challenge can be 
sustained, rather than allowing challenges “for cause.”  In Georgia, 
Illinois, South Carolina, and Virginia a voter cannot be unconditionally 
denied the right to cast a provisional ballot under any circumstances.  
This strictly complies with the HAVA provision that Ohio has chosen to 
ignore.  These states also guarantee that a voter will have the 
opportunity to provide evidence supporting his eligibility before the 
state declares his ballot invalid. 
Of the statutes examined, Georgia was the only state that required the 
challenge to be in writing.  This measure forces a challenger to state the 
grounds for the contest, protecting voters from arbitrary challenges.  The 
Georgia statute also provided the most extensive appeals process of the 
states from the sample.  California, by passing a law that resolves any 
doubt in favor of the voter, recognizes that voting is a fundamental right 
and that voters should not be disenfranchised in the event of ambiguity. 
B.  Conflict Between Ohio Law and Federal Authority 
As discussed in Part II, the Fifteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution prevents states from infringing on the right to vote on 
account of race and gives Congress the power to enforce this right 
 128. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-651 (Michie 2004). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
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through appropriate legislation.131  Based on this right, Congress enacted 
HAVA, which includes a section governing provisional voting 
requirements.132  This section requires that an individual who claims to 
be an eligible voter must be permitted to cast a provisional ballot, even if 
his name does not appear on a list of eligible voters for that precinct.133  
This section of HAVA also requires an election official to verify the 
ballot and give the voter contact information to determine whether his 
vote was counted.134
Despite the precise and unambiguous language contained in this 
section of HAVA, the Ohio Voter Challenger Statute permits judges at 
polling places to refuse a ballot to a party “if for any other reason a 
majority of the judges believes the person is not entitled to vote . . . .”135  
The language of the Ohio statute unquestionably conflicts with, and is 
thus superceded by, the relevant section of HAVA.  Based on this facial 
violation of a federal statute on point, this portion of the Voter 
Challenger Statute should be declared invalid. 
While certain provisions of the Voter Challenger Statute clearly 
violate HAVA, no federal law on point prohibits challengers from being 
present at polling places on Election Day.  Therefore, it is necessary to 
examine whether this statute is overreaching on its face and whether the 
statute permits the implementation of the measure in a manner that 
should be found unconstitutional.136   
Case law handed down from the Supreme Court has established that 
the right to vote is fundamental, and that any alleged infringement of 
that right must be carefully scrutinized.137  Furthermore, Anderson v. 
Celebrezze held that determining the constitutionality of an election law 
requires a district court to balance the magnitude of the injury asserted 
by the voter against the interest of the state and the extent to which the 
burden is necessary to protect the state’s interest.138  The next step in 
determining whether the Ohio Voter Challenger Statute is constitutional 
is to analyze whether the law is narrowly tailored to fit Ohio’s interest in 
preventing election fraud. 
 131. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §§ 1–2. 
 132. See Help America Vote Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545 (2004). 
 133. See id. § 15482(a). 
 134. Id. 
 135. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.20 (West 2005). 
 136. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (holding that equal protection of the law applies to the 
manner in which the law is executed). 
 137. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 138. 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). 
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Ohio law gives election judges the authority to challenge the 
qualifications of voters on Election Day.139  Furthermore, any qualified 
elector may challenge the eligibility of any other voter at any time 
during the year.140  However, a challenge that takes place prior to 
Election Day requires the challenger to state the ground upon which the 
contest is made.141  The presence of election officials at the polls and 
ability to challenge the eligibility of voters before an election takes place 
are evidence of other safeguards Ohio has in place to prevent voter 
fraud.  Based on these safeguards the statute is not narrowly tailored to 
fit this interest. 
The Ohio Voter Challenger Statute must also be analyzed to 
determine whether its implementation violates the Constitution or 
federal law.  The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from denying 
individuals equal protection of the laws.142  The Fifteenth Amendment 
prevents infringement by the states of the right to vote on account of 
race.143  In Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court held that a state may not 
value one person’s vote over that of another.144  This case also states 
that failure to apply rules equally to all voters is unconstitutional.145
The Ohio voter challenger law contains no requirement that 
challenges take place in uniformity across county or precinct lines.  This 
characteristic is evidenced by testimony from the Spencer case that 
established that two-thirds of the 251 additional challengers in Hamilton 
County were to be stationed at predominantly African-American 
precincts.146  Based on this plan of implementation, the Ohio statutes 
leave the door open for disparate treatment across racial lines, violating 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.  Furthermore, one could 
argue that the longer lines caused by the presence of challengers at 
polling places is an indication that the state values the votes of citizens 
in certain precincts less than citizens in precincts where challengers are 
not present.  By limiting the source of challenges to election officials 
only, Ohio could ensure that challenges are consistent across precinct 
lines. 
 139. See Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. Blackwell (Summit County I), 
No. 5:04CV2165, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22539 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3505.20 (West 2004). 
 140. § 3505.19. 
 141. Id. 
 142. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 143. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 144. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Spencer v. Blackwell, 347 F. Supp. 2d 528, 530 (S.D. Ohio 2004). 
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C.  The Flawed Reasoning of the Sixth Circuit 
The ruling of the Sixth Circuit panel, which was released only hours 
before the polls opened on November 2, 2004, overturned the rulings of 
the district courts and opened the gates for private challengers at polling 
places.  This section examines the reasoning behind the majority and 
concurring opinions and argues that these opinions are fundamentally 
flawed.  This section also discusses the dissenting opinion of Judge Cole 
and advocates that the majority should have taken this stance. 
The opinion of Judge Rogers began by refuting the plaintiffs’ 
argument that a more narrowly tailored approach was available.147  
Judge Roberts asserted that this claim was not likely to succeed on its 
merits because the challengers could only initiate the inquiry process 
and that precinct judges were responsible for carrying out the 
challenge.148  However, Judge Rogers failed to recognize that the 
presence of precinct judges at polling places made the function 
performed by private challengers unnecessary.  These precinct judges 
are appointed by the local elections boards, which have an interest in 
preserving the integrity of the voting process.149  Furthermore, while 
precinct judges and other election officials have specific training and 
detailed knowledge of election law,150 the Appointment of Challengers 
Statute allows any eligible voter to serve as a private challenger.151  This 
opinion ignored evidence presented to the district court in Spencer v. 
Blackwell establishing that less than one-third of the registered 
Republican challengers in Hamilton County attended the training session 
for challengers that was held prior to Election Day.152  Additionally, 
while the memorandum written from Secretary of State Blackwell to 
challengers stipulated that challenges must be made for “good cause,” it 
offered no guidelines defining a good faith challenge.153
The opinion went on to reason that employing this procedure may 
cause longer lines at polling places resulting from delay and 
 147. Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. Blackwell (Summit County II), 388 
F.3d 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 148. Id. 
 149. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3501.22 (West 2005).  This statute stipulates the process a 
county board of elections follow to appoint precinct judges. 
 150. See id.  This statute requires elections board members to carefully examine the qualifications 
of each potential precinct judge.  Id. 
 151. See id. § 3505.21. 
 152. Spencer v. Blackwell, 347 F. Supp. 2d 528, 532 (S.D. Ohio 2004).  Drew Hicks, an attorney 
and registered Republican challenger testified to the district court that approximately two hundred 
people attended a training session held on October 31 for challengers.  Id. 
 153. See id. at 531. 
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confusion.154  However, having to endure longer lines at the polls did 
not amount to the type of severe burden that would require the procedure 
be declared unconstitutional.155  This rationalization fails to 
acknowledge that the delay and confusion are byproducts of an 
unnecessary procedure.  As Judge Cole points out in his dissent, each 
polling place is equipped with election officials and election judges to 
challenge potential voter fraud.156  Permitting private challengers to 
contest voter eligibility at polls essentially allows unqualified people to 
perform a function that can be executed by qualified people and creates 
additional chaos without justification.  Judge Rogers’ opinion was based 
primarily on the state’s interest in not having to change its elections 
rules at the last minute157 rather than a careful analysis of the Voter 
Challenger Statute and the manner in which the political parties planned 
to implement the statute. 
Judge Ryan, in his concurring opinion, based his decision on the 
theory that the plaintiffs had no standing because their injury was not 
“actual or imminent,” but rather “conjectural or hypothetical.”158  He 
stated that the Voter Challenger Statute had been on the books in Ohio 
for decades and that the injury asserted by the plaintiffs had never 
surfaced in previous elections.159  Furthermore, he claimed that the 
plaintiffs offered no evidence that the injury alleged by the plaintiffs 
would occur on Election Day.160  However, this statement ignores 
evidence heard by the district court confirming that this would be the 
first election where challengers would actually come to polling places 
and participate in eligibility challenges.161  Judge Ryan based his 
decision on the fact that disorder and confusion have not occurred in 
previous elections without acknowledging that the political parties had 
never sent challengers to precincts in previous elections.  For this reason 
his opinion is fundamentally flawed. 
Judge Cole began his dissenting opinion by acknowledging the 
 154. Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. Blackwell (Summit County II), 388 
F.3d 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 552 (Cole, J., dissenting). 
 157. Id. at 551 (majority opinion). 
 158. Id. at 551–52 (Ryan, J., concurring). 
 159. Id. at 552 
 160. Id. 
 161. See Spencer v. Blackwell, 347 F. Supp. 2d 528, 530 (S.D. Ohio 2004).  Defendant Tim Burke 
testified to the district court that Hamilton County Republican and Democratic parties had traditionally 
filed a list of precinct executives to serve as challengers, but that those named challengers have not 
actually come to the polling places or participated in eligibility challenges in the past.  Id. 
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historic magnitude of the case.162  He noted that this election marked the 
first since the civil rights era where political parties targeted voting 
precincts with predominantly African-American voters to challenge their 
qualifications.163  He recognized his judicial role of balancing the right 
to vote without undue burden against the state’s right to prevent voter 
fraud, but asserted that where this balance is close, the courts must err 
on the side of those exercising the franchise.164  When weighing these 
interests, Judge Cole found that the balance of harms was not even 
close.165  He argued the Voter Challenger Statute is not the least 
restrictive means of advancing the state’s interest based on the presence 
of election officials and election judges at polling places.166  
Additionally, he maintained that the harm caused by chaos and 
uncertainty far outweighed the slight decrease in voter fraud that would 
result from implementation of the statute.167
Judge Cole’s opinion was the only one among the panel to recognize 
that casting a ballot is a fundamental right, and that federal case law 
requires close scrutiny of any measures that restrain this right.168  In 
Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court established that equal protection of the 
law applies to the manner in which a law is exercised and that a state 
may not apply a law to value one person’s vote over another.169  In cases 
such as this, where the state gives authority to local election officials, 
Bush v. Gore places a heightened burden on the state to ensure that the 
laws are applied equally.170  The Ohio Voter Challenger Statute, with its 
broad and ambiguous language, vests the state’s duty of preventing voter 
fraud in county elections boards and private individuals.  Furthermore, 
the law leaves the door open for private individuals and political groups 
to focus its challenges upon a specific racial class.  By allowing private 
challengers to apply the law disparately across racial lines, the Voter 
Challenger Statute does not provide Ohio citizens equal protection of the 
law, and therefore is unconstitutional. 
 162. Summit County II, 388 F.3d at 552 (Cole, J., dissenting). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 554. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 169. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 170. Id. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The Sixth Circuit ruling in Summit County II that stayed the 
injunctions issued by the district courts opened the door for private 
challengers on Election Day.  However, despite the Sixth Circuit ruling, 
very few challenges were made to voters.171  Based on publicity from 
these cases, the Republican Party instructed its challengers only to 
witness the voting process, rather than make individual challenges.172  
Furthermore, media exposure from the Summit County and Spencer 
cases resulted in increased participation among African-American 
voters.173  Plaintiff Donald Spencer believes that if the suit had not been 
filed, Republicans would have been able to intimidate the African-
American community, resulting in a lack of representation at the 
polls.174
Despite the successful turnout of African-American voters and the 
lack of intimidation from Republican challengers, the Ohio Voter 
Challenger Statute violates federal law and is unconstitutional.  This 
regulation gives election judges discretion to deny any voter a ballot 
despite the language of HAVA, which requires election officials to issue 
provisional ballots to voters suspected to be ineligible.  Furthermore, 
allowing private challengers to contest the eligibility of voters at polling 
places allows interest groups and political parties to target the eligibility 
of certain classes of voters.  By allowing these classes to be 
disproportionately targeted, Ohio law does not ensure equal protection to 
voters and violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution. 
 171. See Jordan Green, Challenging Jim Crow in Cincinnati, at http://www.counterpunch.org/ 
green11162004.html (Nov. 16, 2004). 
 172. Id.  In an Election Day interview, Ohio Governor Bob Taft issued a statement that 
Republican challengers would only be witnessing the process and reporting concerns to precinct 
officials.  Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id.  On Election Day, Donald Spencer was quoted, “We are certain that if we had not filed 
the suit, the Republicans might have been able to intimidate and cause a lack of representation in the 
African American community.  We think the big turnout we had in the election may have been caused 
by the publicity this suit brought.”  Id. 
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